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Abstract
We demonstrate how age-adjusted inequality measures can be used to evaluate
whether changes in inequality over time are because of changes in the age struc-
ture. In particular, we explore the hypothesis that the substantial rise in earnings
inequality since the early 1980s is driven by the large baby boom cohorts approach-
ing the peak of the age–earnings profile. Using administrative data on earnings
for every Norwegian male over the period 1967–2004, we find that the impact of
age adjustments on the trend in inequality is highly sensitive to the method used:
while the most widely used age-adjusted inequality measure indicates that the rise
in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s is indeed driven partly by the baby boom, a
new and improved age-adjusted measure indicates the opposite, namely that the
rise in inequality was even larger than what the inequality measures unadjusted for
age reveal.
JEL: D31, D63, D91, E21.
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1 Introduction
The rise in earnings inequality in almost all developed countries since the early 1980s
is one of the most extensively researched topics in economics. While there is substantial
agreement about the facts, there is no consensus about the underlying causes. A number of
explanations have been proposed and scrutinized, including skill-biased technical change,
∗Thanks to seminar participants at “Inequality: New Directions” at Cornell University for useful
comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council (194339) is gratefully
acknowledged. This project is part of the research activities at the ESOP center at the Department of
Economics, University of Oslo. ESOP is supported by The Research Council of Norway.
†Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, ingvild.almas@nhh.no.
‡University of Oslo, Dept. of Economics
§Statistics Norway, magne.mogstad@ssb.no.
1
international trade and globalization, and changes in labor market institutions (such as
a decline in unionization and an erosion of the minimum wage).1 In this paper, we
investigate an alternative, demographic explanation: how much does the changing age
structure matter for the trend in inequality? Is the substantial rise in inequality since the
early 1980s driven by the baby boom cohorts approaching the peak of the age–earnings
profile?
These questions arise from two stylized facts. First, there is a strong age–earnings
relationship. Second, we have seen substantial changes in the age structure over time.
Both theoretical models and empirical results suggest a strong relationship between age
and earnings (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 2003). In particular, the age–earnings relationship
is firmly established as increasing during the working lifespan and usually declining slightly
when approaching retirement. This implies that inequality of earnings at a given point
in time is likely to be present even in an economy where everyone is equal in all respects
but age. Furthermore, almost all developed countries experienced a large increase in
their population growth rate following World War II—more familiarly called the baby
boom.2 Since the 1970s, the baby boomers have gradually entered the labor market, and
as their careers mature, they are making their way up the age–earnings profile. Together,
the changing age structure and the strong age–earnings relationship may be an important
determinant of the observed trends in earnings inequality over recent decades. Identifying
the age effects on inequality and their trend over time is also of interest from a normative
perspective. It has long been argued that inequality attributable to age should be of
little concern for policymakers: differences arising from age disappear over time and are,
therefore, irrelevant for the distribution of lifetime income (see, e.g., Atkinson, 1971).
In this paper, we examine empirically to what extent the changing age structure
can explain the trends in earnings inequality in Norway during the period 1967–2004.
Specifically, we adjust the trends in inequality for changes in the age composition of the
working-age population, using data from administrative registers on earnings for every
Norwegian. Our analytical sample is restricted to males, given their role of primary
breadwinner over most of this period.
In some respect, our approach follows Paglin’s (1975) pioneering paper, which first
raised the question of the effects of the changing age structure on the trend in inequality.
While the validity of Paglin’s method for isolating the age effect on inequality has been
questioned from a number of perspectives—which we address in our analysis—the issue
of isolating the age effect on inequality remains an important research question. In fact,
given the rise in inequality accompanying the aging of the baby boom cohorts over the last
1See e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) and Lemieux (2008) for extensive reviews of the literature
on earnings inequality.
2The baby boomers usually include children born from 1946 to about 1960. For example, The US
Census Bureau considers a baby boomer to be someone born during the demographic birth boom between
1946 and 1964.
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decades, the issue may be viewed as more important than in the earlier period (1947–1972)
considered by Paglin and others.3
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reports some stylized facts about the age–
earnings profile and the age structure in Norway, linking them to the observed trends
in earnings inequality. Section 3 sets out the methods used to identify and adjust for
age effects. Section 4 describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Stylized facts
Age–earnings profiles are widely used by economists, both to help forecast the course of
future earnings and to depict how earnings typically change over the life cycle. Panel
(a) in Figure 1 draws the age–earnings profile in 2001 for Norwegian males aged 25–59,
confirming the picture from other developed countries: average earnings rise rapidly at
younger ages, peak around age 50, and then decline slightly in the latter parts of the
working life.4 Similar profiles are evident throughout the period 1967–2006. The strong
relation between age and earnings implies that earnings inequality in a given year may be
present even in an economy where everyone is equal in all respects other than age, simply
because individuals are at different stages in the life cycle. For example, the earnings of
a 50-year-old are about 40 percent higher than that of a 30-year-old on average, but that
does not mean that the lifetime earnings of 50-year-olds are any higher than the lifetime
earnings of 30-year-olds.
Panel (b) in Figure 1 graphs the size of individual cohorts of Norwegian males from
the total resident population aged 25–59 in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. We immediately
see the relatively small birth cohorts before and during World War II, and the subsequent
boom in population growth. This demographic shift has manifested large changes in the
age composition of the labor force over the course of the previous decades. In particular,
the baby boomers have gradually entered the labor market since the 1970s, and as their
careers have matured, they have made their way along the age–earnings profile. It follows
that inequality in annual earnings may change over time simply because of changes in the
age structure, affecting different parts of the age–earnings profile differently, even though
inequality in lifetime earnings may be unchanged.
Figure 2 illustrates the large amount of ballast that may be embedded in snapshots
of earnings inequality and its time trend, because of the changing age structure. As a
3Paglin’s age adjustment of the Gini coefficient was subject to three rounds of comments and replies
in the American Economic Review (Paglin, 1977, 1979, 1989), has numerous citations, and continues to
be subject to controversy. For a review of the literature, see Alm˚as and Mogstad (2009).
4Throughout this paper, earnings are adjusted for wage growth. This is implemented by using the
basic amount thresholds of the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme (used to define labor market status,
determining eligibility for unemployment benefits as well as disability and old age pension). The basic
amounts are adjusted for wage growth by parliament in the national budget each year.
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(a) Earnings profile in 2000
(b) Age composition in 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Figure 1: Earnings profile (panel (a)) and the changing age composition of the labor force
(panel (b)) for males aged 25–59.
4
benchmark, we compute the classical Gini coefficient (G) in annual earnings of Norwegian
males aged 25–59 over the period 1967–2004. Similar to the situation in most other
developed countries, inequality fell slightly during the 1970s before increasing over the
1980s and into the early 1990s. It should be noted that the spike in inequality in the
early 1990s was associated with tax reform, and that inequality would be likely to have
increased more steadily in the absence of this reform (see, e.g., Fjærli and Aaberge, 2000).
Consider instead inequality in a hypothetical situation where everyone in the economy
is equal in all respects other than age: while earnings vary over the life cycle, every
individual at a given stage of the life cycle would have exactly the same earnings as
others at that stage; i.e., everybody would follow the same age–earnings profile and thus
have equal lifetime earnings. First, we compute the between-group Gini coefficient (Gb) in
2000, which captures the inequality in the age–earnings profile in Figure 1. Specifically, Gb
replaces the earnings of each individual with his age-group mean. We find that Gb makes
up a little under 25 percent of overall inequality in G in 2000. This illustrates that the
age–earning relationship may make us confuse older individuals with richer individuals;
G incorporates substantial cross-sectional inequality that evens out over time.
To get a sense of how inequality in this hypothetical situation would have evolved as
the age structure changes, suppose that the age–earnings profile was the same in each
year as in 2000. Let G˜b denote the between-group Gini coefficient when we replace the
earnings of each individual in every age group with the relevant age-group mean in 2000.
We can see that the trend in G˜b mirrors well the shape in G. This indicates that the
changing age structure may have been an important determinant of the observed trend
in earnings inequality. However, as will be apparent in Section 3, this exercise is far too
stylized to draw inference about the age effect on earnings inequality and its trend, both
because inequality within and across age groups is likely to be changing over the period,
and because overlap in earnings between age groups complicates the picture. Yet, it serves
as motivation to take a closer look at how much the changing age structure matters for
the trend in inequality. That is the focus of the rest of the paper.
3 Age adjustment of inequality
Empirical analyses of inequality in earnings distributions are conventionally based on the
Lorenz curve. To summarize the information content of the Lorenz curve and to achieve
rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves, the classical Gini coefficient (G) is often used,
which is equal to twice the area between the Lorenz curve and its equality reference. In a
seminal paper, Paglin (1975) argues that G overspecifies the conditions of equality when
used with annual data: assuming for the moment no economic growth, perfect equality
requires not only equal lifetime income, but also that individuals of all ages must have
equal earnings in any given year, which can be realized only if there is a flat age–earnings
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Figure 2: Trends in earnings inequality among males aged 25–59 over the period 1967–
2004
Notes: Simulated = G˜b, between inequality in 2000 = Gb in 2000.
profile.
However, a flat age–earnings profile runs counter to consumption needs over the life
cycle as well as productivity variation depending on human capital investment and ex-
perience. As illustrated above, the relationship between earnings and age can produce
inequality at a given point in time even if everyone is equal in all respects but age. More-
over, inequality in annual earnings may change over time simply because of changes in the
age structure: a change in the age structure changes the weights we give to the different
parts of the age–earnings profile, and may subsequently change the measured inequality
even if inequality in lifetime earnings is unchanged. For this reason, it has long been
argued that age adjustments of cross-sectional measures of inequality are necessary (see,
e.g., Atkinson, 1971). Such an adjustment allows us to utilize the cross-sectional data at
our disposal, while avoiding some of the pitfalls associated with its use.
3.1 Age-adjusted inequality measures
In this paper, we use two different approaches to age adjustment. Both have the same
objective: namely, to purge the classical Gini coefficient applied to cross-sectional data
of its interage or life cycle component. In particular, perfect equality corresponds to
everyone receiving the mean earnings of their age group, thereby relaxing the assumption
of a flat age–earnings profile.
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Paglin–Gini. The most common age-adjusted inequality measure, the Paglin–Gini (PG),
was proposed by Paglin (1975) and can be expressed as:
PG =
∑
j
∑
i(|yi − yj| − |µi − µj|)
2µn2
, (1)
where µi and µj denote the mean earnings of all individuals belonging to the age group
of individual i and j, respectively. Applying the standard Gini decomposition, PG can
be rewritten as:
PG = G−Gb =
∑
i
θiGi +R, (2)
where Gb represents the Gini coefficient that would be obtained if the earnings of each
individual in every age group were replaced by the relevant age group mean µi, Gi is the
Gini coefficient of earnings within the age group of individual i, θi is the weight given
by the product of this group’s earnings share niµi
µn
and population share ni
n
(ni being the
number of individuals in the age group of individual i), and R captures the degree of
overlap in the earnings distributions across age groups (see, e.g., Lambert and Aronson,
1993).5
A main controversy surrounding the PG is whether or not R should be treated as
a between-group or a within-group effect. Nelson (1977) and others argue that R is
part of between-group inequality and should thus be netted out when constructing age-
adjusted inequality measures. Paglin (1977), however, maintains that R is capturing
within-group inequality and that PG is accurately defined. Until recently, the issue was
unsettled simply because little was known about the overlap term. Shorrocks and Wan
(2005), for example, refer to R as a “poorly specified” element of the Gini decomposition.
However, Lambert and Decoster (2005) provide a novel characterization of the properties
of R, showing first that R unambiguously falls as a result of a within-group progressive
transfer, and second, that R increases when the earnings in the poorer group are scaled
up, reaching a maximum when means coincide. This makes Lambert and Decoster (2005,
p. 378) conclude that “The overlap term in R is at once a between-groups and a within-
groups effect: it measures a between-groups phenomenon, overlapping that is generated
by inequality within groups.” Consequently, it appears that neither Paglin nor Nelson
was right, as R in part, but not only, reflects earnings differences attributable to age.
Therefore, if PG is to eliminate earnings differences attributable to age in a consistent
way, there must be no overlap between the earnings distributions of different age groups.
As pointed out by Jenkins and O’Higgins (1989), the debate over how R should be
5Overlap implies that the earnings of the richest person in an age group with a relatively low mean
earnings exceeds the earnings of the poorest person in an age group with a higher mean earnings; that
is, yi < yj and µi > µj for at least one pair of individuals i and j.
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interpreted conflates the separate issues of inequality measurement per se and the subse-
quent decomposition of measured inequality. The fact that we cannot separate out the
interage component of R, does not imply that age-adjusted inequality measures are futile.
Instead of trying to adjust for differences attributable to age at the aggregation stage of
inequality measurement, Wertz (1979) advocates that one should transform the measure
of earnings at the individual level, to purge it of its interage component before aggregating
up earnings differences.
Another common criticism of PG is that it assumes that the unconditional distribu-
tion of mean earnings by age represents the age effects, and it does, therefore, not only
eliminate inequality attributable to age but also inequality because of factors correlated
with age, such as education.6 For example, when using PG to evaluate the influence of
age adjustment on the time trend in inequality, we may confuse the effects of changes in
the age structure with the impact of more people taking higher education than before.
Age-adjusted Gini. In the spirit of the critiques of PG, Alma˚s and Mogstad (2009) pro-
pose an alternative age-adjusted Gini coefficient (AG).7 Their method for age adjustment
of inequality may be described as a three-step procedure. First, a multivariate regression
model is employed, allowing us to isolate the net age effects while holding other determi-
nants of earnings constant. Second, the earnings distribution that characterizes perfect
equality in age-adjusted inequality is determined by using the principle of proportionality.
Third, AG is derived and axiomatically justified as an age-adjusted inequality measure.
To see how AG identifies the net age effects on earnings, suppose that the earnings of
individual i in a given year depends on the age group a that he belongs to and a vector
X of individual characteristics, such that:
yi = f(ai)h(Xi). (3)
For simplicity, f is specified as a function of age alone but could in general also reflect
other aspects affecting individuals’ life cycle behavior, such as their time preferences,
interest rates, and the rules governing retirement. In our empirical analysis, we allow for
a flexible functional form of f , yielding the following earnings-generating function:
ln yi = ln f(ai) + lnh(Xi) = δi +X
′
iB, (4)
where δi gives the percentage earnings difference associated with being in the age group of
individual i compared with some reference age group, holding all other variables constant.
Equation 4 is estimated by OLS separately for each year. The key assumption underlying
6See, for example, Danziger et al. (1977) who in an early comment about Paglin’s approach pointed
out that “no single indicator is sufficient to capture trends in normatively relevant inequality without a
well specified multivariate model.”
7Alm˚as and Mogstad (2009) use this measure to study wealth inequality across countries.
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this estimation is that there are no omitted factors correlated with age that determine
individual earnings. In that case, we obtain consistent estimates of the net age effects on
earnings. It is important to emphasize that the objective of the estimation of equation 4
is not to explain as much variation as possible in earnings, but simply to obtain an
empirically sound estimate of the effects of age on earnings.
Identifying the net age effect is only part of the job; it is also necessary to find a con-
sistent way of adjusting for age effects when there are other earnings-generating factors.
There is a considerable literature concerning the problem of how to adjust for some, but
not all, earnings-generating factors when the earnings function is not additively separable
(see, for example, Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) and Kolm (1996)). To eliminate differ-
ences in earnings attributable to age but preserve inequality arising from all other factors,
AG employs the so-called general proportionality principle proposed by Bossert (1995)
and Konow (1996), and further studied in Cappelen and Tungodden (2007). In particular,
the earnings level of individual i that makes him not contribute to age-adjusted inequality
depends on his own age as well as every other earnings-generating factor of all individuals
in the society, and is defined as:
y˜i =
µn
∑
j f(ai)h(Xj)∑
k
∑
j f(ak)h(Xj)
=
µneδi∑
k e
δk
, (5)
where eδk gives the net age effect of belonging to the age group of individual k after
integrating out the effects of other earnings-generating factors correlated with age. No
age-adjusted inequality corresponds to every individual i receiving y˜i, which is the share
of total earnings equal to the proportion of earnings an individual from his age group
would earn if all earnings-generating factors except age were the same for everyone in the
population. If age is uncorrelated with all other earnings-generating factors, y˜i = µi, such
as in PG. Furthermore, if there is no age effect on earnings, y˜i = µ, such as in G.
In order to generalize the standard approach in a way that is useful for age adjustment,
it is helpful to see the correspondence between the standard Lorenz curve and Lorenz
curves expressed in differences. Figure 3 displays standard and difference-based Lorenz
curves, in the special case where the equalizing earnings are equal to the overall mean
in society. Both summarize the area between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz
curve, and hence, the two areas marked “A” are of equal size. As is well known, G is
equal to 2A.
When drawing age-adjusted Lorenz curves, however, the population is ordered not by
their earnings per se, but according to the difference between their individual earnings
and their equalizing earnings. Perfect equality is then characterized as a situation where
each individual receives that share of total earnings that he would hold if all earnings-
generating factors, except age, were equal. Because of the analogy to the classical case, we
can draw Lorenz curves based on the distribution of differences in actual and equalizing
9
Figure 3: The standard and difference-based representation of the classical Lorenz curve.
earnings, (yi − y˜i). AG equals twice the area between this curve and the line of perfect
equality (the x axis in Figure 3).
If there are no age effects on earnings, the age–earnings profile is flat and AG coincides
with G as y˜i = µ for all individuals in every age group. If there is a relationship between
age and earnings, AG will in general differ from G. Both G and AG reach their minimum
value of 0 when everyone receives their equalizing earnings. Moreover, both measures take
their maximum when the difference between actual and equalizing earnings is at its highest
possible level. Specifically, G reaches its maximum value of 1 if one individual receives
all the earnings. In comparison, AG takes its maximum value of 2 in the hypothetical
situation where the equalizing earnings of the individual who has all the earnings is
zero, and the equalizing earnings of one of the individuals with no earnings is equal
to the aggregate earnings in the economy. The fact that AG and G range over different
intervals is therefore a direct result of their different views of perfect equality: age-adjusted
inequality is not only a result of differences in individual earnings, but also a result of
differences in equalizing earnings between individuals of different ages.
Formally, AG is based on a comparison of the absolute values of the differences in
actual and equalizing earnings between all pairs of individuals, defined by:
AG =
∑
j
∑
i
∣∣(yi − y˜i)− (yj − y˜j)∣∣
2µn2
. (6)
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AG also stands out from PG in the way it aggregates earnings differences: in general,
|(yi − y˜i)− (yj − y˜j)| will differ from |(yi − yj)| − |(µi − µj)|, even when y˜i = µi.
To justify their proposed adjustment, Alma˚s and Mogstad (2009) offer a set of con-
ditions that are similar to those underlying the classical Gini coefficient in all respects
but one: equalizing earnings are given not by the mean earnings in society as a whole,
but rather depend on age. First, they impose scale invariance, stating that if all actual
and equalizing earnings are rescaled by the same factor, then the level of age-adjusted
inequality remains the same. Next, they impose anonymity, implying that the ranking of
alternatives should be unaffected by a permutation of the identity of individuals. Third,
they put forward a generalized version of the Pigou–Dalton criterion, stating that a trans-
fer of earnings from an individual i to an individual j, where (yi − y˜i) > (yj − y˜j) both
before and after the transfer, reduces age-adjusted inequality. Finally, they impose a con-
dition called unequalism, implying that the measure only focuses on how unequally each
individual is treated, defined as the difference between his actual and equalizing earnings:
age-adjusted inequality measures should be the same when the distributions of differences
in actual and equalizing earnings are the same.8 As proven by Alma˚s and Mogstad (2009),
AG satisfies all four conditions, while PG fails to meet the unequalism condition.
4 Empirical analysis
Data and descriptive statistics. Our data are based on administrative registers from
Statistics Norway covering the entire resident population in Norway between 1967 and
2004. The unique individual identifier allows us to merge information about individual
characteristics, such as education, with data on annual earnings and earnings taken from
tax registers in each year. From the individual identifiers, we are also able to link indi-
viduals to their parents, allowing the inclusion of controls for family background. In the
analysis, we employ a measure of earnings including all market income from wages and
self-employment. In each year from 1967 to 2004, we include the entire population of
males aged 25–59 who were alive and resident in that year.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for selected years. We see that while real earnings
are increasing over the period, the relation between age and earnings is present in all years.
The demographic wave induced by the baby boomers was presented in detail in panel (b)
of Figure 1. At the same time, there are several changes in the labor force, both in
individual characteristics and in family background. In particular, the level of education
increases steadily over the whole period, for both workers themselves and their parents,
while the immigrant share of the labor force more than doubles. Family size and parental
8This condition may be viewed as analogous to the focus axiom in poverty analysis, stating that a
poverty index should focus entirely on the incomes of the poor (see, for example, Foster and Shorrocks,
1991).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1970 1980 1990 2000
Earnings
Mean 289,707 325,998 342,462 373,084
Age 26–29 248,581 266,849 263,080 289,886
Age 30–39 302,713 336,944 342,187 367,602
Age 40–49 311,392 355,340 386,041 409,659
Age 50–59 275,295 319,540 335,314 380,551
Individual characteristics
Age 42.34 40.73 40.30 41.46
Education (years) 9.79 10.67 11.35 11.88
Immigrant 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.14
No. of children 2.53 2.55 2.47 2.31
Family characteristics
Mother’s education 7.82 8.18 8.59 9.19
Father’s education 8.42 8.96 9.41 9.96
Mother’s age at birth 29.34 29.55 29.04 28.12
Father’s age at birth 32.67 33.02 32.60 31.53
Observations 810,643 892,038 989,901 1,118,735
age decreases somewhat, particularly between 1990 and 2000.
To calculate AG, we first estimate the net age effects running OLS on the regression
equivalent of equation 4, controlling for education, birth order, family size, and immigra-
tion, as well as parental education and age at birth. We then calculate equalizing earnings
as y˜i by applying the transformation in equation 5, and then estimate AG from equation
6. PG is estimated from equation 1.
It should be noted that the age-adjusted inequality measures, like the classical Gini
coefficient, are ordinal in nature and any monotonic transformation of such a measure will
preserve its ranking of distributions. This means that they are only of interest as a way
of comparing and ordering the distributions by inequality. The fact that these inequality
measures range over different intervals is, therefore, beside the point.9
Empirical results. The graph on the left in Figure 4 reports the development in AG, G,
and PG for earnings, estimated separately for each year between 1967 and 2004. Three
main findings appear. First, in the period of convergence between 1967 and 1980, AG
shows a more moderate decrease compared with G. This conforms well to the prediction
from the exercise in Section 2. PG, on the other hand, suggests that the changing age
9Specifically, G can range from 0 to 1, PG from 0 to G, and AG and WG from 0 to 2. Normalizing
these measures so they range over the same interval is possible, but it will not affect the ranking of the
earnings distributions.
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Figure 4: Trends in earnings inequality among males aged 25–59 over the period 1967–
2004 (left panel), and relative change in inequality from the base year (right panel).
Notes: G = Gini, AG = Age-adjusted Gini controlling for education, PG = Paglin–Gini, see Section 3.
composition contributed to reduce the earnings inequality over this period, as reflected in
a more pronounced drop in inequality in PG than in G.
Second, between 1980 and 1993, when the baby boomers were approaching the peak
of their age–earnings profile, PG shows a slightly more modest increase in inequality
than G. Relying on this most common approach to age adjustment, we might therefore
conclude that the large increase in inequality in the 1980s was driven at least in part by
changing demographics. However, the new and improved approach suggested in Alma˚s
and Mogstad (2009) concludes the opposite: the measured increase in inequality is even
larger than classical inequality measures would suggest.
Finally, Figure 4 shows that the slight drop in inequality in the early 2000s, suggested
by both G and PG, is not manifested in the estimated AG. If anything, inequality seems
to be rising in this period, illustrating again that properly accounting for changes in age
composition can be crucial for interpreting changes in the distribution of earnings.
The measured trend in unadjusted inequality is important in its own right, providing
first evidence of the time trend in earnings inequality of the male labor force in Norway
over the last few decades. We can see that classic inequality decreased substantially be-
tween 1967 and 1980, dropping by about 10 percent. Earnings inequality then rebounded
between 1980 and 1993, to surpass previous levels in the late 1980s, before dropping again
between 1993 and 2004. Overall, the period under study saw a slight rise in inequality,
estimated at about 2.5 percent. The much-studied boom in inequality during the 1980s
is quite apparent, however, with an increase of about 25 percent from a bottom of 0.30
in 1980 to a peak of 0.38 in 1993.
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Overall, our findings conform well to Paglin’s (1975) study of the effects of age ad-
justment on earnings inequality in the US over the period 1947–1972: they suggest that
changes in the age structure had major consequences for the trend in earnings inequality.
However, Paglin’s suggested adjustment performs quite differently from the adjustment
implemented by AG, which addresses two common criticisms of PG.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper demonstrated how age-adjusted inequality measures can be used to evaluate
whether changes in inequality over time are because of changes in the age structure. In
particular, we investigated to what extent age adjustments affect the trend in in earnings
inequality in Norway between 1967 and 2004. We found that it does, and further that
the impact of the adjustment depends crucially on the method applied.
Before adjusting for age, the classic Gini shows a substantial decrease in inequality
between 1967 and 1980, a sharp increase between 1980 and 1993, and then a drop from
1993 to 2004. Overall, our estimates reveal a slight increase in inequality from 1967 to
2004.
Our preferred measure of age-adjusted inequality revealed, however, a more modest
decline in inequality in the first period, a somewhat larger increase in inequality in the
intermediate period, and a steeper decline in inequality in the latest period. Overall, this
measure suggested an increase in inequality over the whole period that is modestly higher
than what is revealed by the classical Gini coefficient.
These findings stand in sharp contrast to the results from the much-used approach
proposed by Paglin (1975), which has been questioned from a number of perspectives.
Using Paglin’s measure, the estimates show a steeper decline of inequality in the first
period, a less steep increase in inequality in the intermediate period, and no change in
inequality in the latest period.
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